Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers

Tobias Regner

The Centre for Market and Public Organisation from The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: We study the pricing and tipping behaviour of users of the online service `Google Answers'. While they set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. We develop a model that is based on reciprocal theories of social preferences pioneered by Rabin (1993) and extended by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). The predictions of our model are empirically tested with the field data we obtained. The reasons for leaving a tip are analysed. A significant amount of users are motivated by social preferences. We also find strong support for reputation concerns. Moreover, researchers appear to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. We conclude that an endogenous incomplete contracts design encourages people to contribute voluntarily. This is motivated by reciprocity when people are socially minded, but also generally by strategic behaviour to build up a good reputation. Efficiency is increased when contracts are left open deliberately as high effort is sustained.

Keywords: social preferences; reciprocity; moral hazard; reputation; internet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C24 C70 C93 D82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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