Which Democracies Pay Higher Wages?

James Rockey

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: This paper asks if and how constitutions affect labour market outcomes. This question is motivated by Rodrik (1999), who suggests that 'democracies pay higher wages' and Persson and Tabellini (2003) who provide evidence that constitutions impact on economic outcomes. An empirical analysis using treatment effect estimators and Bayesian Model Averaging provides robust causal evidence that presidential democracies are associated with lower wages, after controlling for other potential determinants such as the level of income per capita.

Keywords: Democracy; Constitutions; Wages; Factor Shares; Bayesian Model Averaging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 J31 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab and nep-pol
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Related works:
Working Paper: Which Democracies Pay Higher Wages?* (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:07/600

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