Corruption and Power in Democracies

Francesco Giovannoni

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: According to Acton: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". We study the implications of Acton's dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton's dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which describe plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.

Keywords: Corruption; Incumbency; Government Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/efm/media/workingpapers/w ... pdffiles/dp12624.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption and power in democracies (2014)
Working Paper: Corruption and Power in Democracies (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:12/624

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vicky Jackson ().