Corruption and Power in Democracies
Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK
According to Acton: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". We study the implications of Acton's dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton's dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which describe plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.
Keywords: Corruption; Incumbency; Government Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
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Journal Article: Corruption and power in democracies (2014)
Working Paper: Corruption and Power in Democracies (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:12/624
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