Endogenous Assembly Rules, Senior Agenda Power, and Incumbency Advantage

Jon Eguia and Kenneth Shepsle

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in the assembly. We predict that the agenda protocol chosen in equilibrium disproportionately favors more senior legislators, granting them greater opportunities to make policy proposals, and it generates an incumbency advantage to all legislators.

Keywords: Seniority; incumbency advantage; endogenous agenda; recognition rule; legislative bargaining; bargaining rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:14/638

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