Zero-hours Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market

Juan Dolado, Etienne Lalé () and Helene Turone

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: We propose a model to evaluate the U.K.'s zero-hours contract (ZHC)- a contract that exempts employers from the requirement to provide any minimum working hours, and allows workers to decline any workload. We find quantitatively mixed welfare effects of ZHCs. On one hand they unlock job creation among firms that face highly volatile business conditions and increase laborforce participation of individuals who prefer flexible work schedules. On the other hand, the use ofZHCs by less volatile firms, where jobs are otherwise viable under regular contracts, reduces welfare and likely explains negative employee reactions to this contract.

Date: 2022-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-lma
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Related works:
Working Paper: Zero-hours Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market (2022)
Working Paper: Zero-hours Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market (2022)
Working Paper: Zero-hours Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market (2021)
Working Paper: Zero-Hours Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:22/763

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