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The Re-running Margin: Incumbency and Turnover in African Parliaments, 1963–2024

Leandro De Magalhães and Anna Brian

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: Using newly digitized election results and a name-matching algorithm that tracks individual candidates across elections, we provide the first systematic estimates of the effect of winning a legislative seat on re-running in the next election across 17 African countries and 86 elections (1963–2024). Getting back on the ballot is the first gate to re-election. Incumbent re-running rates average 47%, turnover averages around 70%, and barely winning raises the probability of re-running by a median of 21 percentage points and of winning the next election by only 9—far below the US and the UK, where re-running is near-universal, turnover is far lower, and incumbency effects on re-running and winning are far larger. We look at country specific academic literature, news sources, cross-country comparisons of indexes of parliamentary power, and text analysis of Hansard parliamentary activity to study the mechanism through which re-running is determined. The results are mostly consistent with re-running suppression by the executive. Monitoring incumbent re-nomination rates may help evaluate elections before a single ballot is cast.

Date: 2026
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