In Broad Daylight: Full Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Promote Cooperation

Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman

No 2012-3, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higher-order punishment increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing, including its past history, and opportunities to punish are unrestricted. Availability of higher-order punishment reduces cooperation and efficiency if it is restricted to counter-punishing alone, if past history is unavailable, and if there is a dedicated counter-punishment stage.

Keywords: collective action; social dilemma; voluntary contribution; public goods; punishment; counter-punishment; higher-order punishment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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