The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation

Pedro Dal Bã› and Enrique R. Pujals
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pedro Dal Bó

No 2013-5, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate. We provide partial eciency results for asymmetric strategies.

Keywords: # (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj72 ... ers/2013-5_paper.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2013-5

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brown Economics Webmaster ().