Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra

No 2017-4, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern imposes credibility on coalitional deviations. Their credibility notion can be extended to cover farsighted coalitional deviations, as proposed by Harsanyi (1974), and more recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). However, the resulting farsighted stable set suffers from a conceptual drawback: while coalitional deviations improve on existing outcomes, coalitions might do even better by moving elsewhere. Or other coalitions might intervene to impose their favored moves. We show that every farsighted stable set satisfying some reasonable, and easily verifiable, properties is unaffected by the imposition of this stringent maximality requirement. These properties are satisfied by many, but not all, known farsighted stable sets.Creation-Date: 2017

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Journal Article: Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set (2019)
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