Competition in Network Industries: Evidence from the Rwandan Mobile Phone Network

Daniel Björkegren

No 2020-04, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the potential for competition policy to affect welfare and investment in a network industry. When a network is split between competitors, each internalizes less network effects, but may still invest to steal customers. I structurally estimate the utility of adopting a mobile phone from subsequent usage, using transac-tion data from nearly the entire Rwandan network. I simulate the equilibrium choices of consumers and network operators. Adding a competitor earlier could have reduced prices and increased incentives to invest in rural towers, increasing welfare by the equivalent of 1% of GDP.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-net and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj72 ... aper%202020--004.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition in network industries: Evidence from the Rwandan mobile phone network (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2020-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brown Economics Webmaster ().