Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication

Zeky Murra-Anton and Roberto Serrano

No 2023-001, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Can evidence or mediation change a sender’s behavior and improve the receiver’s expected utility in persuasive communication frameworks? In a mediated Bayesian persuasion model with unverifiable evidence, evidence cannot improve the receiver’s expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the intermediary communicates the evidence, the receiver’s expected utility improves only with a positive autarky value of the intermediary’s private information (AVIPI), a novel information accuracy measure we propose. Finally, the sender’s strategic behavior is generally affected by the intermediary’s presence as he tries to persuade the intermediary to, in turn, persuade the receiver.

Date: 2023
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