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Evasão fiscal sob estruturas comportamentais

Gabriela Pantoja () and Rodrigo Andrés Peñaloza ()
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Gabriela Pantoja: Departamento de Economia (Department of Economics) Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação (FACE) (Faculty of Economics, Administration, Accounting and Information Science) Universidade de Brasília

No 346, Working papers - Textos para Discussao do Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia from Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia

Abstract: We study the strategic interactions between the scal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We t this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.

Keywords: tax evasion; Bayesian equilibrium; behavioral consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 D82 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Date: 2011-01
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