Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis

Virginie Boinet ()

Economics and Finance Discussion Papers from Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University

Abstract: Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a fixed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.

Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2002-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bru:bruedp:02-07

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