Flexibility vs. screening: the performance effects of temporary agency work strategies

Michael Beckmann () and Dieter Kuhn ()
Additional contact information
Michael Beckmann: University of Basel
Dieter Kuhn: University of Basel

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: This paper empirically examines the impact of temporary agency work strategies on firm performance using panel data from German establishments. Thereby, special attention is devoted to the question, whether there are performance differences between establishments using temporary agency workers (TAWs) as a buffer stock (flexibility strategy) and establishments testing TAWs for permanent positions (screening strategy). Theoretically, there are good reasons for using one strategy as well as adopting the other. On the other hand, however, both strategies may also be associated with serious drawbacks to be borne by the establishments. Our empirical analysis suggests that establishments following the flexibility strategy perform significantly worse than establishments following the screening strategy. Hence, we conclude that employers act in their own interest, if they credibly consider temporary workers for permanent jobs instead of implementing a system of first- and second-class employees.

Keywords: Temporary agency work; firm performance; flexibility strategy; screening strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 J24 J42 J82 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://edoc.unibas.ch/28161/1/Flexibility_vs_Screening_LabEc.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2012/03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WWZ ().