The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests

Daniel Müller ()
Additional contact information
Daniel Müller: University of Basel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Mueller ()

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of doping substances is costly but not further regulated. The main finding of the analysis is the existence of a doping threshold. In our leading case only strong athletes dope. The level of the doping threshold is increasing in the doping costs and decreasing in the prize level. Furthermore, increasing the number of athletes affects the doping decision in two ways. More competition increases the incentives to dope for strong athletes. At the same time, we find a discouragement effect for weak athletes.

Keywords: Auctions; Contests; Doping; Heterogeneity; Private Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://edoc.unibas.ch/61349/1/20180306163925_5a9eb62d31a6f.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2013/05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WWZ ().