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The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg () and Larry Samuelson
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Nöldeke, Georg: University of Basel

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Georg Nöldeke ()

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case) all increasing decision functions are implementable under a single crossing condition, and to obtain an existence result for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model.

Keywords: Implementation; Duality; Galois Connection; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Principal-Agent Model; Two-Sided Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
Date: 2015-03-14
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Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2015/01