Optimal income taxation with tax competition

Vilen Lipatov and Alfons Weichenrieder

No 1207, Working Papers from Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation

Abstract: We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal- taxation model with two skill levels and analyze a symmetric subgame- perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry and increases employment of the less productive individuals. When countries are heterogeneous, this e¤ect is more pronounced in the smaller country.

Keywords: optimal income tax; migration; unemployment; tax competition; Leviathan government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/WP1207.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/WP1207.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/WP1207.pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Income Taxation with Tax Competition (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:btx:wpaper:1207

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dongxian Guo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).