Governance and taxes: evidence from regression discontinuity

Andrew Bird () and Stephen Karolyi
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Andrew Bird: Carnegie Mellon University

No 1520, Working Papers from Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation

Abstract: We implement a regression discontinuity design to examine the effect of institutional ownership on tax avoidance. Positive shocks to institutional ownership around Russell index reconstitutions lead, on average, to significant decreases in effective tax rates (ETR) and prioritisation of cash over book-tax savings. They also lead to greater use of international tax planning using tax haven subsidiaries. These effects are smaller for firms with initially strong governance and high executive equity compensation, suggesting poor governance as an explanation for the undersheltering puzzle. Furthermore, we observe the largest decreases among high ETR firms, and increases for low ETR firms, consistent with institutional ownership pushing firms towards a common level of tax avoidance.

Date: 2015
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