Institutional Distorsions, Clientelism and Corruption: Evidence from Romania

Clara Volintiru ()
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Clara Volintiru: London School of Economics and Political Science

No 1, Working Papers from Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Research Center in International Business and Economics (RCIBE)

Abstract: This paper addresses the way in which clientelistic exchanges distort the public institutions’ functions and their relationship to the general public. In the first section, a theoretical model of the relationship between clientelistic exchanges and institutions is put forward, based on the existent literature on the subject. The second section of this paper explores the empirical evidence provided by the case study of Romania. The analysis is based on official documents and data covering the incidence of corruption and the discretionary use of public resources.

Keywords: Institutions; Clientelism; Public Spending; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2012-06
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Published in CCREI Working Papers Series, June 2012

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bus:wpaper:1

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