Strategy Learning in 3x3 Games by Neural Networks

Daniel Sgroi and Daniel Zizzo

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper presents a neural network based methodology for examining the learning of game-playing rules in never-before seen games. A network is trained to pick Nash equilibria in a set of games and then released to play a larger set of new games. While faultlessly selecting Nash equilibria in never-before seen games is too complex a task for the network, Nash equilibria are chosen approximately 60% of the times. Furthermore, despite training the network to select Nash equilibria, what emerges are endogenously obtained bounded-rational rules which are closer to payoff dominance, and the best response to payoff dominance.

Keywords: rationality; learning; neural networks; normal form games; complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D00 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-mic
Note: EMT
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0207

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