Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity

Gert Brunekreeft

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper applies the concept of regulatory threat to analyse the electricity supply industry in Germany, where in contrast to other European member states, there is no ex-ante regulation of network access charges. Instead, network access relies on industrial self-regulation and ex-post control by the Cartel Office. The paper modifies the concept of regulatory threat to vertically related markets, stressing the balance between the level of the network access charges and (non-price) discrimination against their parties. The conceptual framework appears to explain developments in the German electricity sector accurately and thus provides a useful tool for policy analysis.

Keywords: regulation; discrimination; network industries; electricity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 L51 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2002-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-rmg
Note: CMI IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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