Auctions and trading in energy markets -- an economic analysis
David M Newbery () and
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Auctions are playing an increasingly prominent role in the planning and operation of energy markets. Comparing the New Electricity Trading Arrangements to the former electricity Pool in England and Wales requires some analysis of the relative merits of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules, and use of the gas network in Britain and electricity interconnectors around Europe is allocated on the basis of auction results. In this paper we discuss the changes in the trading arrangements in the electricity industry in England and Wales as well as some of the results to date. We also look at the wider issue of using auctions to replace regulation by market solutions for managing the natural monopolies in energy markets.
Keywords: auctions; electricity; gas; interconnectors; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L5 L94 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Auctions and trading in energy markets - an economic analysis (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0233
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