‘How Different is Wireless Access? Implications for Internet Mergers

Emanuele Giovannetti

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Network hierarchies in the Internet are often not fixed: two providers can be simultaneously input supplier and retailer in a routing process, while being horizontally competing in another. We introduce a stylised network model capturing these aspects of the Internet to study the impact of differentiation introduced by wireless access on prices and profits. We then study the incentives for, and welfare impact of, a merger between the wireless provider and a local bottleneck fixed access one. These effects crucially depend on the degree of differentiation between the wireless and fixed Internet access modalities. Pricing, at each router, follows the motorway toll metaphor.

Keywords: mergers; internet; network industries; wireless access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L86 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-net
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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