Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts

Petra Geraats ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives related to transparency, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts. A simple dynamic monetary policy game shows how transparency reduces inflation, as has been found empirically. Although transparency exposes weak central banks, the negative market feedback in response to secrecy could provide a sufficiently strong inducement to become transparent. Thus, reputational concerns could lead to transparency, even without formal disclosure requirements.

Keywords: transparency; monetary policy; central bank forecasts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: Ma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0473

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