A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France

Jean-Michel Glachant () and Dominique Finon

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes.

Pages: 31
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ene
Note: CMI, IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France (2005)
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