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Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice

Petra Geraats ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policymaking during the last decade. This paper establishes some stylized facts. In addition, it provides a systematic overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows much diversity in information disclosure, even for central banks with the same monetary policy framework, including inflation targeting. Nevertheless, the paper finds significant differences in transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empirical findings are explained using key insights distilled from the theoretical literature. Thus, this paper aims to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency.

Keywords: : Transparency; monetary policy; central bank communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fmk, nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: Ma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice (2005) Downloads
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