An Empirical Analysis of the 2000 Corporate Tax Reform in Germany: Effects on Ownership and Control in Listed Companies

Anke Weber

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper is a first attempt to analyse the implications of the 2000 corporate tax reform on ownership concentration in Germany. The empirical results document a fall in ownership concentration and a decrease in the power of top institutional owners including the big banks. The description of German corporate governance as a bank-based system may hence no longer apply. However, contrary to what was expected by proponents of the reform, the corporate tax reform did not revolutionise German corporate governance. Ownership concentration in 2005 is still high compared to the Anglo-American economies and an active market for corporate control is not observed.

Keywords: Voting-block statistics; blockholders; corporate control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
Note: IO
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Journal Article: An empirical analysis of the 2000 corporate tax reform in Germany: Effects on ownership and control in listed companies (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0556

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