Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks

Paul Joskow

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Modern theoretical principles to govern the design of incentive regulation mechanisms are reviewed and discussed. General issues associated with applying these principles in practice are identified. Examples of the actual application of incentive r egulation mechanisms to the regulation of prices and service quality for “unbundled” transmission and distribution networks are presented and discussed. Evidence regarding the performance of incentive regulation in practice for electric distribution and transmission networks is reviewed. Issues for future research are identified.

Keywords: regulation; incentives; networks; electricity; transmission; distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 94
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-reg
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0511.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks (2014)
Working Paper: Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks (2006)
Working Paper: INCENTIVE REGULATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE - ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION NETWORKS (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0607

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