Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview

Michael Grubb and Karsten Neuhoff ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) has an efficient and effective market design that risks being undermined by three interrelated problems: the approach to allocation; the absence of a credible commitment to post-2012 continuation; and concerns about its impact on the international competitiveness of key sectors. This special issue of Climate Policy explores these three factors in depth. This policy overview summarizes key insights from the individual studies in this issue, and draws overall policy conclusions about the next round of allocations and the design of the system for the longer term.

Pages: 44
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-eec, nep-ene and nep-env
Note: IO
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (125)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0622.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview (2006)
Working Paper: Allocation and Competitiveness in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Policy Overview (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0645

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().