One Cheer for Foreign Lobbying

Toke Aidt and Uk Hwang

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper presents an argument in favor of foreign lobbying. We show how foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities and promote social objectives.

Keywords: Foreign lobbying; common agency; campaign contributions; cross national externalities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0860

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