Efficiency Analysis of Energy Networks: An International Survey of Regulators
Aoife Haney () and
Michael Pollitt ()
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Incentive regulation for networks has been an important part of the reform agenda in a number of countries. As part of this regulatory process, incentives are put in place to improve the cost efficiency of network companies by rewarding good performance relative to a predefined benchmark. The techniques used to establish benchmarks are central to the efficiency improvements that are ultimately achieved. Much experience has been gained internationally in the application of benchmarking techniques and we now have a solid understanding of the main indicators of best practice. These include the use of frontier-based methods; a large and high quality dataset; panel data; and bootstrapping techniques. What we are lacking is a more complete understanding of the factors that influence choice of methods by regulators, i.e. characteristics that may encourage or discourage regulators to adopt best practice methods.
Keywords: Electricity; Gas; Benchmarking; Efficiency analysis; Incentive regulation; Energy networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-ene and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Efficiency analysis of energy networks: An international survey of regulators (2009)
Working Paper: Efficiency Analysis of Energy Networks: An International Survey of Regulators (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0926
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