A Core Equilibrium Convergence in a Public Goods Economy
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
This paper shows a core-equilibrium convergence in a public goods economy where consumers' preferences display warm glow effects. We demonstrate that if each consumer becomes satiated to other consumers' provision, then as the economy grows large the core shrinks to the set of Edgeworth allocations. Moreover, we show that an Edgeworth allocation can be decentralized as a warm glow equilibrium.
Keywords: competitive equilibrium; warm glow; public goods; Edgeworth; core; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 C71 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Journal Article: A Core‐Equilibrium Convergence in a Public Goods Economy (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1022
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