Network Procurement Auctions

Thomas Greve (thomas.greve@iscte-iul.pt) and Michael Pollitt

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: In most network asset procurement exercises, network configurations are predefined by the auctioneers. Bidders can neither propose different network configurations nor can they submit bids on a group of network links. We believe the market itself can be designed better. We present a lot structure and an auction design where bidders might propose and build different network configurations and where bidding for packages is a possibility. We demonstrate why the auction design in this paper should be considered for future network procurement exercises through an example, inspired by UK offshore electricity transmission assets, to illustrate our idea.

Keywords: Auctions; Networks; Investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pub ... pe-pdfs/cwpe1347.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Network Procurement Auctions (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1347

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer (jd419@cam.ac.uk).