Interaction, Protection and Epidemics

Sanjeev Goyal and Adrien Vigier

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Individuals respond to the risk of infectious diseases by restricting interaction and by investing in protection. We develop a model that examines the trade-off between these two actions and the consequences for disease prevalence. There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to interact more relative to those who do not invest in protection. Changes in the contagiousness of the disease have nonmonotonic effects: as a result interaction initially falls and then rises, while disease prevalence too may initial increase and then decline. We then consider a society with two communities that differ in their returns from interaction - High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protection and interaction and a lower rate of infection. Integration amplifies these differences.

Date: 2014-06-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
Note: sg472
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Journal Article: Interaction, protection and epidemics (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1458

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