Power Sector Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Electricity Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa
Manuel Llorca and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Manuel Llorca ()
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
We analyse the impact of corruption and two key aspects of electricity sector reforms, such as the creation of independent regulatory agencies and private sector participation, on several performance indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that corruption reduces technical efficiency of the sector and constrains the efforts to increase access to electricity and national income. However, some negative effects are offset where independent regulators are established and privatisation is implemented. Our findings suggest that well-designed reforms not only boost economic performance of the sector, but also reduce the negative effects of macro-level institutional deficiencies, such as corruption, on performance indicators.
Keywords: Panel data; dynamic GMM; electricity sector reform; corruption; Sub-Saharan Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q48 D02 K23 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-ene and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1801
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