The Role of Headhunters in Wage Inequality: It's All about Matching
Alexey Gorn ()
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
This study relates the increase in the U.S. top wages to the increasing prominence of headhunters. Headhunters improve the matching between firms and employees via two channels: screening of candidates and passive on-the-job search. I incorporate headhunters in the labor market framework of random search with two-sided heterogeneity. The calibrated model shows that headhunters can account for 35% of the increase in the top 1% wage share and 69% of the increase in the top 10% wage share in the U.S. from 1970 to 2010. I provide supporting cross-country evidence on headhunter hires/fees and top income growth, as well as micro evidence for CEO compensation.
Keywords: wage distribution; top incomes; sorting; on-the-job search; headhunters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D83 E24 J24 J62 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: The Role of Headhunters in Wage Inequality: It's All about Matching (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1926
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().