Political Economy of Reform and Regulation in the Electricity Sector of Sub-Saharan Africa
Tooraj Jamasb and
Manuel Llorca ()
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
As part of their electricity sector reforms, Sub-Saharan African countries have established independent regulatory agencies to signal legal and political commitment to end self-regulation and provision of service by the state. The reforms aimed to encourage private investments, improve efficiency, and extend the service to the millions who lacked access to it. However, after nearly two and half decades of reforms, these expectations have not been met and the electricity sectors of these countries remain undeveloped. There are anecdotes that these outcomes are due to poor design, non-credible, unpredictable regulations, and political interference. This paper investigates the performance of the reforms in the context of government political ideology. We use a dynamic panel estimator and data from 45 countries from 2000 to 2015 to analyse the role of ideological differences in the effect of independent sector regulation on access to electricity and installed capacity. We find negative impact from independent regulatory agencies on installed capacity in countries with left-wing governments, while in countries with right-wing governments we find positive effects on capacity. Also, we find negative impact on access in countries with left-wing governments, while we find no significant impact for countries with right-wing governments. The results have interesting policy implications for private sector participation, increased generation capacity and access rates especially in countries with left-wing governments.
Keywords: independent regulation; electricity sector reform; government ideology; dynamic GMM; Sub-Saharan Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 Q48 L51 L94 O55 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-ene, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:1949
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().