Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces

Matthew Elliott, Andrea Galeotti, Andrew Koh and Wenhao Li

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: There are many markets that are networked in these sense that not all consumers have access to (or are aware of) all products, while, at the same time, firms have some information about consumers and can distinguish some consumers from some others (for example, in online markets through cookies). With unit demand and price-setting firms we give a complete characterization of all welfare outcomes achievable in equilibrium (for arbitrary buyer-seller networks and arbitrary information structures), as well as the designs (networks and information structures) which implement them.

Date: 2023-02-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-net
Note: mle30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces (2023)
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