Industrial cyberespionage in research and development races

Oleh Stupak

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper examines a dynamic R&D race in which competitors can conduct cyberespionage against each other. We develop a framework that analyses the influence of cyberespionage on innovative incentives, companies' payoffs and the quality of the end product. We demonstrate that industrial espionage has an ambiguous influence on the overall investments exerted in the race and companies' expected payoffs and might even be beneficial for the quality of innovative end-products under certain circumstances.

Keywords: Firm Strategy; Enterprise Policy; Innovation; Inventions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L53 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-04-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sbm
Note: os446
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:2337

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