Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers

Sandeep Baliga () and Robert Evans

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989) exists.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C78 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:9601

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().