Learning Standards of Social Behaviour in a Stationary Society
Mario Gilli ()
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
In this paper I propose a general model of repeated strategic interaction with possibly private information, which is particulary suitable to study learning processes.
Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 C19 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:9610
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