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Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Utilities

David M Newbery ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Privatisation of utilities is about ownership rather than control. Liberalisation can induce greather improvements in performance than privatisation alone. Regulation id inevitably inefficient, and adequately competitive network services may improve efficiency. History indicates that regulated vertical integration is durable so that liberalisation may be hard to sustain. Theory and evidence suggest that pricing network access and use is difficult., risking foreclosure without regulation. Progress in modelling competitioon over, for and between networks is reported. the English electricity industry demonstrates the importance of entry conditions and contracts, and the gains from restructuring are estimated.

Keywords: COMPETITION; REGULATION; PRIVATISATION; NETWORKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D43 L51 L94 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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