Experimental Evidence on the Relation Between Network Centrality and Individual Choice

Syngjoo Choi, Sanjeev Goyal, Fulin Guo and Frédéric Moisan

Janeway Institute Working Papers from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Social interactions shape individual behavior and public policy increasingly uses networks to improve effectiveness. It is therefore important to understand if the theoretical predictions on the relation between networks and individual choice are empirically valid. This paper tests a key result in the theory of games on networks: an individual’s action is proportional to their (Bonacich) centrality. Our experiment shows that individual efforts increase in centrality but at a rate of increase that is lower than the theoretical prediction. These departures from equilibrium are accompanied by significant departures in individual earnings from theoretical predictions. We propose a model of network based imitation decision rule to explain these deviations.

JEL-codes: C92 D83 D85 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-soc and nep-ure
Note: sg472
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.janeway.econ.cam.ac.uk/working-paper-pdfs/jiwp2401.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Experimental Evidence on the Relation Between Network Centrality and Individual Choice (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camjip:2401

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Janeway Institute Working Papers from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jake Dyer ().