Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983

Louis Hotte () and Stanley Winer ()

No 00-11, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.

Keywords: political competition; probabilistic voting; political influence; tax policy; public goods; GEMTAP; computable equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 D7 H20 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2000-03, Revised 2001-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published: Revised version in Public Choice, Vol. 109, No. 1-2 (October 2001), pp. 69–99

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: With Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983 (2001)
Working Paper: Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983 (1998)
Working Paper: Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: With Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983 (1998)
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