The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters

Stanley Winer () and Walter Hettich ()
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Walter Hettich: Department of Economics, California State University at Fullerton

No 02-11, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we review both positive and normative aspects of taxation. We examine how to study why taxes and revenue structures have taken their present form and why they are used in a particular way as part of the democratic process. In addition, we also consider the classic normative questions, namely what makes a good tax system and how to assess the efficiency of taxation. In dealing with both aspects of the tax literature, we attempt to set out a plan for a more complete and comprehensive analysis of taxation in the face of collective choice than is attempted in most of the available literature on fiscal issues.

Keywords: taxation; revenue structure; collective choice; democratic process; optimal tax. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H10 H11 H20 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2002-08-03, Revised 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published: Revised version in Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 1, ed. Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, Kluwer Academic, 2004, pp. 173–190

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:car:carecp:02-11

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