Can Technology Transfer Induce the South to Sign International Environmental Agreements? – revised version: Technology Transfer and the South’s Participation in an International Environmental Agreement

Larry Qiu and Zhihao Yu ()

No 03-01, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a North-South model of international trade and transboundary pollution to analyze the relationship between environmental technology transfer and the South's incentive to sign an international environmental agreement (IEA). First, we show that technology transfer could either increase or reduce the South's incentive to sign the IEA. Second, we show that the South's participation in the IEA would reduce the market incentive of technology transfer. Both results have very clear policy implications for (i) the sequence of technology transfer and the South's IEA membership and (ii) the legitimacy of South's subsidies for technology transfer.

Keywords: Trade and environment; Environmental technology transfer; Imperfect competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2003-02-15, Revised 2009-08
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Published: Revised version: Technology Transfer and the South’s Participation in an International Environmental Agreement, Review of International Economics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (August 2009), pp. 409–427

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