Why Take on the Tobacco Industry: the Political Economy of Government Anti-smoking Campaign

Zhihao Yu ()

No 03-04, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper shows that government anti-smoking campaign can benefit thegovern-ment in the political bargaining with the tobacco industry by reducing the latter’s alter-native welfare. Although the equilibrium regulation on the tobacco industry increases as a result of government anti-smoking campaign, the political contribution from the tobacco industry will not necessarily go down. Anti-smoking campaign reduces the welfare of the tobacco industry but its potential loss of not lobbying increases. When the incumbent government/politician becomes more hungry for political contribution, it increases its effort in anti-smoking campaign and this could induce more political contribution from the tobacco industry under some plausible conditions.

Keywords: Political Economy; Anti-smoking Campaign; Political Contribution; Special Interest Groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2003-05-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Published: Carleton Economic Papers

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