Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence

Zhihao Yu ()

No 03-07, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: How is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying? This paper develops a model of ‘direct’ (lobbying the government) and ‘indirect’ (persuading the public) competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary. However, an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion, or a rise of public environmental awareness, induces substitution between the two. The findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints, but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and the growing public environmental awareness.

Keywords: Public Persuasion; Lobbying; Political Advertising; Environmental Policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 F2 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2003-07-04, Revised 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

Published: Revised version in Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 2005), pp. 269–286

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Journal Article: Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence (2005)
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