Government Antismoking Campaigns: An Endogenous Yardstick Political Competition Approach
Zhihao Yu ()
No 04-13, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics
This paper develops an endogenous yardstick competition approach to examine the effects of government anti-smoking campaigns. It finds that government anti-smoking campaigns can benefit the government in political bargaining with the tobacco industry by reducing the tobacco lobby's alternative welfare. Anti-smoking campaigns not only push up the equilibrium taxation on tobacco but also force the tobacco lobby to increase its political contributions because the bargaining position of the industry becomes weaker. The paper also finds that when the effectiveness of campaign spending on the expected vote share increases, the incumbent government / politicians will increase their effort in anti-smoking campaigns, and as a result, extract more political contributions.
Keywords: Government Anti-smoking Campaigns; Bargaining Position Endogenous Yardstick Competition; Political Contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Published: Carleton Economic Papers
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:car:carecp:04-13
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