Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution

Ingela Alger

No 09-06, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: How can a desire to cooperate in one-shot interactions survive, even though it gives a material disadvantage to its carrier? I analyze this issue using a one-shot public goods game between two altruistic individuals. Within a pair, the least altruistic individual is better off materially. Between pairs, individuals in the pair with the highest degree of altruism are better off materially. I determine the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching. The stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity, and it may be negative. It is also increasing in the degree of assortativity. For a given degree of assortativity, the stable degree of altruism depends on the relative strength of the within-pair and the between-group e¤ect on material welfare. This relative strength in turn depends on the production and cost functions in the underlying public goods game.

Keywords: public goods; teamwork; altruism; evolution of preferences; evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-08-26, Revised 2010-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Published: Revised version in Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 12, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 789–813

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Journal Article: Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:car:carecp:09-06

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